Post by Icarus on Mar 26, 2008 8:21:03 GMT -5
Does the language we speak influence the way we think about and experience the world? The most famous theory on this question-the Sapir Whorf linguistic relativity hypothesis-holds that language “is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas, but is itself a shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual’s mental activity” (Whorf, 1956). Two forms of this hypothesis-strong and weak-have been proposed.
According to the strong form of the linguistic relativity hypothesis, language determines our perceptions of reality, so we cannot perceive or comprehend distinctions that don’t exist in our own language. Orwell’s description of Newspeak, the language developed by the totalitarian rulers in his novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, portrays in frightening terms how language restricts thought:
Don’t you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible because there will be no words in which to express it….Every year fewer and fewer words, and the range of consciousness always a little smaller….The revolution will be complete when the language is perfect.
-George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949; pp. 46-47)
Orwell’s description suggests that language determines thought through the words it makes available to people. We cannot talk about objects or ideas for which we lack words. The ways we thinks about the world are determined by the way our language slices up reality.
The strong form of the linguistic relativity hypothesis has not fared well in research. Consider some of the facts. Some languages have only two basic words (“dark” and “white”) to cover the whole spectrum of colors. Yet people from these and all other known language groups can discriminate between and communicate about whatever large number of colors are shown (Heider and Oliver, 1972). Most likely any concept can be expressed in any language, though not with the same degree of ease and efficiency. Before either T.V. or the word “television” existed, for example, someone undoubtedly referred to the concept of “ a device that can transmit pictures and sounds over a distance.” When new concepts are encountered, people invent words (“laser”) or borrow them from other languages (“sabotage” from French, “goulash” from Hungarian).
Thus, the strong linguistic relativity hypothesis that language determines thought has found little support. But there is considerable evidence for a weak form of this hypothesis. The weak form of the linguistic relativity hypothesis says that each language facilitates particular forms of thinking because it makes some events and objects more easily codable or symbolizable. In fact, the availability of linguistic symbols for objects or events has been shown to have two clear effects: 1)It improves the efficiency of communication about these objects and events. 2) It enhances success in remembering them.
Communication efficiency is often improved when the language includes labels that distinguish among similar objects. For example, one tribal group, the Hanunoo, for whom rice is a staple food, have 92 names for rice (Brown, 1965). Each name conveys the shape, color, texture, state, and so on, of a different type of rice. This makes communication easy and precise. To convey the same information in English would be possible, but less efficient.
The availability of linguistic symbols also affects memory for objects and persons. This was shown in a study that involved subjects who spoke English or Chinese (Hoffman, Lau, and Johnson, 1986). This study used English and Chinese language descriptions of two people whose traits could be easily labeled in English but not in Chinese and of two other people whose traits could easily be labeled in Chinese but not in English. Three groups of participants read the descriptions: English monolinguals, Chinese-English bilinguals who read in Chinese and Chinese-English bilinguals who read in English. The participants’ memory was much better when the information about the target conformed to labels in the participant’s language of processing. These results lend support to the weak form of the linguistic relativity hypothesis.
Source of Article: Social Psychology by H. Andrew Michener, John D. DeLamater, and Daniel J. Myers
According to the strong form of the linguistic relativity hypothesis, language determines our perceptions of reality, so we cannot perceive or comprehend distinctions that don’t exist in our own language. Orwell’s description of Newspeak, the language developed by the totalitarian rulers in his novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, portrays in frightening terms how language restricts thought:
Don’t you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible because there will be no words in which to express it….Every year fewer and fewer words, and the range of consciousness always a little smaller….The revolution will be complete when the language is perfect.
-George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949; pp. 46-47)
Orwell’s description suggests that language determines thought through the words it makes available to people. We cannot talk about objects or ideas for which we lack words. The ways we thinks about the world are determined by the way our language slices up reality.
The strong form of the linguistic relativity hypothesis has not fared well in research. Consider some of the facts. Some languages have only two basic words (“dark” and “white”) to cover the whole spectrum of colors. Yet people from these and all other known language groups can discriminate between and communicate about whatever large number of colors are shown (Heider and Oliver, 1972). Most likely any concept can be expressed in any language, though not with the same degree of ease and efficiency. Before either T.V. or the word “television” existed, for example, someone undoubtedly referred to the concept of “ a device that can transmit pictures and sounds over a distance.” When new concepts are encountered, people invent words (“laser”) or borrow them from other languages (“sabotage” from French, “goulash” from Hungarian).
Thus, the strong linguistic relativity hypothesis that language determines thought has found little support. But there is considerable evidence for a weak form of this hypothesis. The weak form of the linguistic relativity hypothesis says that each language facilitates particular forms of thinking because it makes some events and objects more easily codable or symbolizable. In fact, the availability of linguistic symbols for objects or events has been shown to have two clear effects: 1)It improves the efficiency of communication about these objects and events. 2) It enhances success in remembering them.
Communication efficiency is often improved when the language includes labels that distinguish among similar objects. For example, one tribal group, the Hanunoo, for whom rice is a staple food, have 92 names for rice (Brown, 1965). Each name conveys the shape, color, texture, state, and so on, of a different type of rice. This makes communication easy and precise. To convey the same information in English would be possible, but less efficient.
The availability of linguistic symbols also affects memory for objects and persons. This was shown in a study that involved subjects who spoke English or Chinese (Hoffman, Lau, and Johnson, 1986). This study used English and Chinese language descriptions of two people whose traits could be easily labeled in English but not in Chinese and of two other people whose traits could easily be labeled in Chinese but not in English. Three groups of participants read the descriptions: English monolinguals, Chinese-English bilinguals who read in Chinese and Chinese-English bilinguals who read in English. The participants’ memory was much better when the information about the target conformed to labels in the participant’s language of processing. These results lend support to the weak form of the linguistic relativity hypothesis.
Source of Article: Social Psychology by H. Andrew Michener, John D. DeLamater, and Daniel J. Myers